Abstract-In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE-1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE design of secure and efficient key agreement protocols is notoriously far from being a simple task; there are so many details involved (including the complicated interactions with the environment) that the designer cannot establish beyond doubt that his protocol is infallible. This holds regardless of whether security proofs are supported by heuristic arguments or developed in formal models of distributed computing. In practice, the degree of confidence accompanying a protocol (as with many other cryptographic primitives) increases with time as the underlying algorithms (and assumptions) survive many years of public scrutiny without any significant flaws being discovered.
In SAC'05, Strangio [10] proposed an efficient two-pass elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (ECKE-1) that makes use of public key authentication. This protocol belongs to the class of Diffie-Hellman based key exchange schemes [3] affording implicit key authentication (IKA), i.e. both parties are ensured that no other principals aside from their intended peers may learn the established secret key. Strangio claimed that protocol ECKE-1 enjoys important security attributes such as known-key security (K-KS), forward secrecy (FS), unknown key-share resilience (UK-SR), key control (KC), and key-compromise impersonation resilience (K-CIR).
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In this letter we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks and present an improved protocol ECKE-1N which is key-compromise impersonation resilient. Notably, protocol ECKE-1N achieves performance figures and security properties that are comparable to those of the mainstream MQV protocol [8] .
II. REVIEW OF PROTOCOL ECKE-1
We briefly review protocol ECKE-1 ( Figure 1, [10] ). Domain parameters are defined by the 8-tuple
where q is the underlying field order, FR (field representation) is an indication of the method used to represent field elements in F q , the seed S is for randomly generated elliptic curves, the coefficients a, b ∈ F q define the equation of the elliptic curve E(F q ) over F q , the base point P = (P.x, P.y) of large prime order in E(F q ), the prime order n of P and the cofactor h = E(F q )/n (where E(F q ) denotes the number of points in the curve E(F q )).
The domain parameters Φ EC should be appropriately chosen so that no efficient algorithms exists that solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) or the Computational DiffieHellman Problem (CDHP) in the subgroup P . The point P ∞ denotes the identity point in P . The domain parameters must also undergo a validation process proving the elliptic curve has the claimed security attributes [4] .
Capital 
are issued by mutually trusted Certification Authorities (CA). The maps F 1 , F 2 : {0, 1} * → F q represent two independent hash functions and G :
Correctness of the protocol follows from the equality T A = T B ; in this case honest parties A and B will both compute the same session key from the shared secret elliptic curve point
. The scalar multiplication using the cofactor h prevents the small-subgroup attack [8] .
III. A KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION ATTACK ON
PROTOCOL ECKE-1 In this section we show that protocol ECKE-1 [10] suffers from a vulnerability that exposes it to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks.
Suppose the long-term private key of a principal A is compromised by the adversary E. Obviously, E is now able to impersonate the corrupted party to any other party. However, it is also desirable that knowledge of the private key does not enable the adversary to impersonate other entities to the corrupted party. Accordingly, a key-compromise impersonation attack is an attack whereby E, with A's long-term private key at hand, attempts to establish a valid session key with A by masquerading as another legitimate principal (say B).
A detailed description of the K-CI attack against protocol ECKE-1 is outlined below (see also Figure 2 -E A(w A , W A ), B(w B , W B ) A :
attack is successful. Consequently, when A wants to initiate a secure communication with any specific entity, E can always intercept the first protocol message Q A and subsequently impersonate the entity to A, until the compromise is detected and the long-term key is revoked.
IV. AN IMPROVED PROTOCOL
In this section we present protocol ECKE-1N, which is key-compromise impersonation resilient. The specification of protocol ECKE-1N is shown in Figure 3 .
As in [5] , A and B must make sure that Q B = P ∞ , Q A = P ∞ , respectively.
Correctness of the protocol immediately derives from the equality T A = T B = h(r A + e A )(r B + e B )P. The map H : {0, 1} * → F |q|/2 is a collision resistant hash functions which outputs |q|/2 bits. As a consequence, the on-line computational effort for each principal is mostly due to the 2.5 scalar multiplications, one field multiplication and one field inversion.
We now show that protocol ECKE-1N is resilient to K-CI attacks. Suppose the adversary E has learned the longterm private key w A of principal A; she is now able to set up a man-in-the-middle attack during a run of the protocol between A and B. The attack should work as follows. E lets message Q A reach its intended destination (B) but replaces B's response Q B with X. On receipt of X, A computes the elliptic curve point T A = hw
−1
A (r A + e A )(X + e B W A ). Algorithm E receives in input the data w A , Q A , Q B , W A , W B and must output the value T A computed by A. A straightforward strategy for E is to compute r A ; however, extracting r A from Q A is unfeasible for the adversary since by our assumptions the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is intractable in the underlying elliptic curve group. Now, the question is whether E is able to choose a suitable message X, in order to cancel the terms that depend on r A from T A , by exploiting the algebraic properties of the group (similarly to the attacks of [10] ). In fact, it appears that the term e B W A can be eliminated by choosing X = r E W B − e B W A since we would have
However, E is unable to determine such an X since she must solve the non-linear recursive equation
The protocol also enjoys other important security attributes. Forward secrecy is achieved by means of the term r A r B P (common factor of T A , T B ) and holds due to the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). Note that here we refer to the weaker form of forward secrecy that involves a passive adversary (who knows the long-term private keys of both peers) eavesdropping on a session of the protocol and then attempting to expose the key [5] . The inclusion of both identities (id A , id B ) in the terms e A , e B can preclude UK-S attacks since they are involved in the calculation of the session key and therefore the replacement of a certificate (e.g. the public keys of A, B registered with a different identity) would not allow the communication to take place (the parties would accept different keys).
The conjectured security attributes of several one-round elliptic curve Diffie-Hellmann key agreement protocols that use public key authentication are summarised in Table I . The first column indicate whether the protocols enjoy implicit key authentication (IKA). Column two shows that all protocols satisfy the basic key independence (K-KS) security requirement while only protocol MTI/A0 does not provide forward secrecy (column three). Column four reveals that ECKE-1N enjoys K-CI resilience together with the MQV, HMQV and MTI/A0 protocols. Finally, columns five (UK-SR) and six (KC) show that all listed protocols enjoy the unknown key-share resilience and key control (the abbreviation "init" refers to the initiator party) security attributes respectively.
Additionally, we note that by adopting the elegant idea from [7] , namely hashing ephemeral and long-term private keys, our protocol provides resilience to the leakage of ephemeral private keys (see [12] for more details).
The computational effort required by each principal in the above protocols is reported in Table II . Column one counts the number of exponentiations while column two shows the number of field multiplications. Hash function calculations are enumerated in column three (key derivation functions are omitted since they apply to all protocols -note also that some hash computations can be done off-line). Finally, column four displays the number of field inversions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter we have shown that protocol ECKE-1 [10] is insecure against key-compromise impersonation attacks. We have also presented an improved protocol ECKE-1N that can withstand such attacks and achieves overall performance and security comparable to the well-known standardized MQV protocol.
Future work includes formally proving the security of the protocol in a model of distributed computing (e.g. [2] , [7] ).
